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INTRODUCTION
Ireland and crisis governance: continuity and change
in the shadow of the financial crisis and Brexit
Mary C. Murphya and John O’Brennanb
aDepartment of Government and Politics, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland; bDepartment
of Sociology, Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland
ABSTRACT
Ireland’s relationship with the European Union (EU) has, since 2008, been tested
by an enduring and complex series of economic and political crises. The
contributions to this special issue examine these EU-linked crises through a
variety of Irish perspectives, including the impact on public opinion,
environmental policy, migration policy, foreign policy and the state’s
positioning on Brexit. In the introduction to this special issue, we review how
the Irish-EU nexus was challenged by and responded to the financial crisis
and Brexit. This sets the scene for a deep examination of how other crises
have been experienced in Ireland; how collectively these developments have
challenged Irish-EU relations; and what this means for patterns of
Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation across different policy sectors and
political settings. In this context, we highlight an evolving political and
economic landscape of both continuity and change in Ireland where the
relative influence of the EU, in the shadow of crisis, is determined by discrete
political circumstances and policy specific dynamics.
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Introduction
The Irish experience of European integration from 2008 to Brexit1 has been
characterised by extreme volatility. A series of complex and intersecting
crises have challenged the nature, scope and intensity of Ireland’s relationship
with and commitment to the European Union (EU). The failure of the Lisbon
Treaty referendum in June 2008 provoked dismay among Ireland’s EU part-
ners and threatened to derail the protracted Treaty revision process. This
was followed by a much more serious crisis as the Irish banking system’s
near-implosion led to a sovereign debt crisis only ‘relieved’ by an EU
‘bailout’ and the subsequent close supervision (2010–2013) of the Irish
economy by the so-called Troika, consisting of the European Commission,
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). The reputational damage wrought by both these episodes was
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considerable and presented an enormous challenge to Irish policy-makers in
the years that followed (Rees and O’Brennan, 2019).
Then, just as the economy returned to a positive growth trajectory, the
United Kingdom (UK) electorate voted on 23 June 2016 to leave the EU.
The Brexit vote occasioned a new set of pronounced challenges for all
strands of life across the Irish polity, economy and society.
These two crises, however, constitute but part of ‘a prolonged period of dis-
tress for the EU’ (Zeitlin et al., 2019, p. 963). Multiple (sometimes simultaneous)
crises, including the sovereign debt crisis within the Eurozone, the migration
crisis, democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe, geopolitical chal-
lenges on Europe’s borders, a tide of growing Euroscepticism and an increas-
ingly antagonistic US-EU relationship since the 2016 election of Donald
J. Trump as President of the United States, have formed part of what
former European Commission President Jean Claude Juncker (2016) termed
a ‘polycrisis’ for the EU.
We argue that Ireland should be viewed as one of the more compelling
case studies during this period of protracted EU crises. As a traditionally
pro-EU small-state and from a landscape where the EU was (for the most
part) closely associated with positive developmental change in Ireland, the
economic crisis placed Dublin at odds with Brussels almost for the first time
in its four-decades-old membership. In contrast, Brexit revealed much
greater levels of EU support and solidarity for Ireland as the state navigated
a potentially existential political and economic domain.
But Ireland also confronts multiple challenges in dealing with other facets
of the EU’s polycrisis, including climate change, tax justice, and migration, and
the domestic management of these crises holds implications for Ireland’s
international reputation, diplomatic relationships and positioning within the
European Union. In confronting this complex set of challenges, Ireland has
typically conformed to rather than confronted the prevailing EU position.
The polycrisis, however, demonstrated that the Irish relationship with the
EU was indeed changing: the crises both confirmed some long-established
tendencies in Irish politics and public policy, but profoundly changed
others. It is evaluating and mapping this landscape of both continuity and
change in Ireland and the relative influence of the EU on different elements
of politics and public policy in the shadow of the financial crisis and Brexit
that this special issue focuses on.
This introductory article provides a detailed account of the backdrop
against which this pattern of continuity and change in the EU-Ireland relation-
ship has evolved since 2008. Specifically, we detail the EU’s approach to crisis
management (especially the financial crisis), and track how Ireland adjusted –
economically, politically and institutionally – to new modes of EU crisis gov-
ernance. The impact of the polycrisis on Ireland’s wider policy landscape is
interrogated and we discuss longer-term empirical and conceptual trends
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which will define Ireland’s future relationship with the EU and impact on pat-
terns of Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation.
Rationale for this special issue
Ireland constitutes an interesting ‘small state’within the EU, and has oscillated
between the status of ‘model pupil’ and ‘errant member’ over almost five
decades of membership. For most of the early period after accession (the
1970s and the 1980s), there seemed precious little ‘value added’ accruing
to Ireland from being part of the European Community. But this was largely
because of the different ways in which Irish elites managed to throw away
the advantages offered by membership through the pursuit of populist and
unsustainable spending policies (Lee, 1989; O’Brennan, 2010, 2020). It was
only around the 20-year mark that Ireland began to noticeably reap
benefits from being part of the EU ‘club’. The operationalisation and deepen-
ing of the EU single market contributed to a period of substantial net gain for
the Irish economy, in terms of increased trade, investment and employment
levels (see Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008, p. 232). In addition, historically signifi-
cant subventions from the EU budget (especially in the 1990s) helped raise
Irish productivity and also improve the physical infrastructure of the
country (see Barry et al., 2001). By the early 2000s, Ireland seemed an exemplar
for other small states (especially in Central and Eastern Europe) as its economy
took off in spectacular style (O’Brennan, 2010). This positive trajectory,
however, would be setback hugely by a sustained period of crisis after 2008.
The polycrisis was based on a series of intersecting and mutually reinfor-
cing challenges which were (and are) testing the EU’s resilience, its power
base, its capacity for solidarity, its connection to its citizens and its future. It
appeared to some commentators that a ‘perfect storm’ of crises was truly exis-
tential and that the EU might not even survive (see Krastev, 2017; Krastev and
Holmes, 2019; Rosamond, 2019). However, the EU responded by changing ‘the
EU’s governance mix’ (see Börzel, 2016, p. 14) to a form of ‘crisis governance’
based on recurring European Council summit meetings and incremental
adjustments to the supranational-intergovernmental balance, which mostly
favoured the latter over the former.
Framing the Irish relationship with the EU: ‘Europeanisation’
and ‘de-Europeanisation’
Studies of if and how, Ireland has experienced Europeanisation, have consti-
tuted an important part of the scholarly approach to understanding Ireland’s
relationship with the European Union. Europeanisation research explores the
EU’s impact on the domestic policies, institutions, and political processes of EU
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member states. Ladrech (1994, p. 69) was one of the first EU scholars to define
Europeanisation as:
an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the
degree that EC [European Community] political and economic dynamics
become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-
making.
Europeanisation provides a framework for mapping and tracking the
extent to which the EU influences and (irreversibly) changes domestic
member states’ institutions, policies, political parties and polities. Feather-
stone (2003, p. 5) notes that Europeanisation is applied within four broad cat-
egories as: ‘an historical process; as a matter of cultural diffusion; as a process
of institutional adaptation; and as the adaptation of policy and policy pro-
cesses’. Radaelli (2003) refers to Europeanisation as entailing EU influenced
processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation which then
become embedded in all facets of the domestic political, cultural, institutional
and policy arena. The Europeanisation literature, however, is not without its
critics. Bulmer and Burch (2005), for example, have questioned Europeanisa-
tion’s top-down perspective and presumptive focus on the EU as the main
source of domestic change in European political systems.
There has been growing critical engagement with the Europeanisation lit-
erature from an Irish perspective. Hayward and Murphy (2010) noted the limits
to which political parties in Ireland, north and south, were Europeanised after
1973. O’Brennan’s (2010, 2012a) evaluations of both the Oireachtas’ and party
political engagement with Europe suggest a much more slight engagement
on the part of Irish actors and institutions. Adshead’s (2005) study noted
that both intra- and inter-state dimensions of Europeanisation were increas-
ingly impacting on the traditional conservative and clerical character of the
Irish state. Rees, Quinn and Connaughton (2009) find some evidence of the
Europeanisation of Irish institutions and policies, based on a process
whereby both domestic forces and global factors were also influential. O’Bren-
nan and Murphy (2014) suggest Ireland’s EU membership has produced ‘pat-
terns of differential Europeanisation of Irish public policy, leading to an at least
partial socialisation of Irish actors into EU norms, a strengthening of executive
power and a minimal role for the Oireachtas in EU affairs’.
The Europeanisation literature is challenged by the extended period of EU
crisis after 2008 and this has occasioned deeper critical engagement with the
concept. Indeed, such has been the severity of the polycrisis that scholars
have been actively interrogating the notion of de-Europeanisation and query-
ing its significance for theorising a process of EU dis-integration (see Rosa-
mond 2019; Webber, 2018). The de-Europeanisation literature is not, as yet,
extensive and there are disagreements among scholars as to how, precisely,
the concept should be understood. Notwithstanding such definitional
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pluralism, scholars converge around viewing de-Europeanisation as ‘a process
of disengagement combined with the intentional decision to reverse the
impact of Europeanization’ (Copeland, 2016, p. 1126). Intuitively, a period of
crisis presents an opportunity for (some) member states to arrest and (poten-
tially) reverse features of the Europeanisation process. Collective decision-
making stasis can also act as a catalyst of de-Europeanisation. However,
during periods of crisis, it becomes particularly difficult to isolate the impact
of the EU on domestic institutional arrangements and actors. As Saurugger
(2014, p. 182) notes:
… crises shorten the timeframe under which decision makers operate, they
make problems more salient and lead to higher politicisation in which routine
decisions in specific sectors, or standard operating procedures, are very
difficult to implement.
The contributions to this special issue confront this challenge of under-
standing the intersections of EU and domestic politics and policies during
a time of polycrisis and how these influence Irish understandings of and
approaches to EU membership. This involves addressing the Europeanisation
critique through a dual focus on European and domestic influences, and
measuring the extent to which processes of de-Europeanisation formed
part of the Irish response to the EU’s period of crisis. This collection, there-
fore, is conceived as a state-of-the-art analysis of the Irish relationship with
the EU during the polycrisis. It supplements and nuances some notable indi-
vidual contributions on Ireland’s response to the financial crisis and Brexit
from economics, sociology and political science (examples include the
work of Coulter (2015); Patrick Holden (2020, forthcoming); Peadar Kirby
(2010, 2011); Laffan (2020, forthcoming); O’ Riain (2014); Hardiman (2016);
Murphy (2018); O’Brennan (2019, 2020, forthcoming); Regan and Brazys,
2018; O’ Rourke (2019)). This text is distinctive in that it undertakes a detailed
examination of a tumultuous period which threatened to, but ultimately did
not, derail Ireland’s relationship with the EU. In so doing, it identifies the fun-
damental issues which characterised Ireland’s navigation of the polycrisis (in
particular the financial crisis and Brexit) and its adaptation to changing EU
governance rules and institutions.
Ireland, the financial crisis and EU ‘Crisis Governance’
In confronting the deeply challenging environment it faced after 2008, the EU
introduced a series of reforms and adapted its institutions. The Eurozone was
of course the epicentre of the EU’s financial and sovereign debt crisis and the
EU’s management of these crises has come in for withering criticism from
economists (Mody, 2018; Stiglitz, 2017; Tooze, 2018). More recently the Euro-
zone has become a veritable institutional and legal construction site, as the EU
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moved from continual fire-fighting to ‘repair the house’ throughmultiple insti-
tutional reforms of Eurozone governance.
The most noteworthy reform came with the enactment of the Fiscal Treaty
in 2012. In institutional terms, this Treaty represented a dramatically signifi-
cant break with the existing EU governance architecture. German Chancellor
Angela Merkel, in particular, favoured moving from the traditional ‘community
method’ to what she termed the ‘union method’. The Chancellor’s important
speech at the College of Europe on 2 November 2010 set out her thinking
(Merkel, 2010). The ‘community method’ (‘Gemeinschaftsmethode’) is the
EU sphere where laws are enacted by the Council of Ministers (representing
member state governments) in conjunction with the European Parliament
(representing EU citizens). These laws are enacted on the basis of proposals
generated by the European Commission which is enjoined by the treaties
to act in the European interest. Implementation and compliance is in the
remit of both the European Commission and the European Court of Justice;
national public administrations also play an important role in a system
which revolves around a search for consensus.
But this ‘community method’ (which is perceived to have served Irish inter-
ests well for almost fifty years of EU membership) gave way somewhat during
the successive crises within the Eurozone to the ‘union method’ of decision-
making where most important decisions are taken by the Council of Ministers
and European Council. France and Germany effectively re-configured their
approach to EU governance during the Eurozone crisis as both Chancellor
Merkel and former French President Nicolas Sarkozy wanted ‘more De
Gaulle and less Monnet’, more intergovernmental decision-making (where
they could potentially dominate) and less of the supranational collectivism
which distinguished the community method (O’Brennan, 2012b). Remarking
on the newly technocratised and executive-led model of EU crisis governance,
Ivan Krastev (2017) argued that, at the height of the crisis, the EU arrived at a
point where national governments had politics, but were no longer in control
of policy, including budgetary policy, which moved via the Fiscal Treaty and
other measures, to the EU level. On the other side of this divide, the EU, he
claimed, had policies but no politics, since decisions were increasingly being
made by technocratic managers rather than directly elected representatives
of the European public. The Eurozone crisis thus amplified an existing
problem – the absence of both a European demos and a transparent European
level political process. In electing a new government in 2011 at the height of
the financial crisis, Irish voters changed the coalition government that ruled
them, but that government proved powerless to change the underlying
fiscal approach which had been decided in Berlin, Brussels and Frankfurt.
Where former Labour Party leader Eamon Gilmore – in electioneering
mode – proclaimed that it would be ‘Labour’s way, not Frankfurt’s way’, the
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opposite in fact proved to be the case (O’Brennan, 2012b, see also O’ Toole,
2012, p. 44).
The Irish response to the Eurozone crisis
Prior to the financial crisis, European integration was widely perceived to have
benefited the Irish economy in three important ways. First, by providing
market access and opportunities for Irish firms which the home market
could not provide. Second, by anchoring Ireland in the single market after
1987, European integration helped turn Ireland into a mecca for foreign
direct investment (FDI) which increased exponentially in the 1990s and
2000s (Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008). Third, the vast increase in EU subvention
to Ireland after the introduction of the 1988 ‘Delors Plan’ helped build vital
physical infrastructure and kick-start Ireland’s economic boom, the ‘Celtic
Tiger’. For many Irish people, EU membership constituted an unvarnished
economic good, although there was always some opposition from various
groups on the left and right of the political spectrum (see Simpson, 2019).
The financial crisis upended that positive perspective and severely challenged
Ireland’s confidence and standing in Europe. The near-collapse of the Irish
banking system in 2008, the Government decision to guarantee all bank
deposits and then the EU/ECB/IMF financial bailout in November 2010 was
deeply humiliating and financially costly (and, in the case of the bank guaran-
tee, vexed many of Ireland’s EU partners).
From being the poster child of success in the era of globalisation, Ireland
became a warning signal about the dangers of ‘irrational exuberance’ (Kirby,
2010, 2011). When the IMF issued its first annual report on Ireland subsequent
to September 2008, it wrote, in its measured way, that the Irish crisis ‘matches
episodes of the most severe economic distress in post-World War II history’
(quoted in Kirby, 2015, p. 281). After all, the then Minister for Finance, Brian
Lenihan of Fianna Fáil, in announcing a state guarantee covering customer
deposits and the banks’ own borrowings to a total of €440 billion early on
the morning of 30 September 2008, to avert what was feared would be the
imminent collapse of at least one bank, had described his government’s
approach as providing the ‘cheapest bailout in history’ (Lenihan, quoted in
The Irish Times, 10 June 2011.) Yet, as became ever clearer over the subsequent
thirty months, what the government had done was to hand Irish taxpayers the
bill for the reckless practices of the Irish banking sector during the economic
boom, a bill that grew exponentially over that period resulting in a budget
deficit in 2010 of 32 per cent of GDP: the worst contraction of the Irish
economy in the state’s history, accompanied by an unemployment rate of
14.7 per cent by early 2011 (see Mody, 2018, pp. 267–273 for data and sequen-
cing). It was the loss of credibility and the steady downgrading by rating
agencies of both the state’s and the banks’ credit ratings, that made the Irish
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banking system increasingly dependent onday-to-day support from the ECB. In
September 2008, Irish banks owed the ECB €19 billion; by November this figure
had reached €40billion (Mody, 2018, p. 267) The extent of this support set alarm
bells ringing in Frankfurt and Brussels, forcing the Irish government to accept a
rescue package from the EU, the ECB and the IMF at the end of November 2010
totalling €85 billion. This wasmade up of €10 billion for re-capitalisation of Irish
banks; a €25billion bank contingency fund; and a €50billion sum to support the
state’s borrowing requirements for the next three years.2
Such was the unprecedented extent and scale of the crisis, the Irish state
was forced to adopt a series of swingeing austerity packages to try to calm
financial markets and reassure the European Commission. This culminated
in a four-year austerity plan, entitled The National Recovery Plan 2011–2014,
setting out in detail how Ireland planned to return the budget deficit to 3
per cent of GDP by 2014 as demanded by the European Commission. Cuts
in public spending totalled €10 billion and tax rises of €5 billion were rolled
out over four years. Cuts were spread widely and included reducing the
number of public servants by 25,000 from 307,000; cutting the pay of new
entrants to the public service by 10 per cent; reducing public service pensions
by up to 12 per cent; and cutting spending on health, education and social
welfare (see Coulter, 2015, p. 9; Kirby, 2015; and O’ Toole, 2012, pp. 8–11 on
the scale of the cuts). Controversially, the Irish state contributed a further
€17.5 billion to the bailout, €12.5 billion of it from the National Pension
Reserve Fund, effectively depleting this last financial reserve at the govern-
ment’s disposal. The average interest rate on loans was 5.85 per cent. The
terms of the bailout agreement endorsed many of the measures contained
in the Irish government’s four-year austerity plan and involved deeply intru-
sive oversight by officials of the EU, ECB and IMF of Irish budgetary and expen-
diture decisions. The state was subject to six monthly monitoring visits by the
Troika. In effect, Ireland became a ‘rule-taker’ rather than a ‘rule-maker’; econ-
omic sovereignty may not have been entirely lost but Irish agency was
severely eroded by the demands of the ‘Troika’ and the implementation of
the associated austerity regime.
The package was extensively criticised in Ireland for the high-interest rate
(see Coulter, 2015, p. 9, for example) but also for the failure of the European
institutions to share any of the burden of adjustment. The influential Irish
Times columnist Fintan O’Toole (The Irish Times, 2010, p. 11), for example,
wrote that the package:
is muchmore [Treaty of] Versailles than Marshall [Plan]. There is no sharing of the
burden. There is no evidence of a single thought for the consequences of mass
unemployment, mass emigration and war on the most vulnerable. There is no
European solidarity… The sadistic pleasures of punishment have trumped the
sensible calculation that an Ireland enslaved by debt is not much use to anyone.
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In an April 2011 interview, Lenihan stated that the government sought to
impose losses on the (Irish) banks’ senior bondholders, but that the option
was ruled out by the troika: ‘I discussed the matter with Dominique Strauss-
Kahn [IMF managing director] himself and Monsieur Trichet [ECB president],
but it was clear to me there was no budge on this whatsoever in the discus-
sions’ (Mody, 2018, p. 272). The EU insistence on austerity, as the only viable
path to recovery. undoubtedly made the task of Irish recovery much more
difficult. As Peadar Kirby (2015) argued:
it can be concluded, therefore, that if Europe is widely seen to have contributed
to Ireland’s economic development over the decades since joining the then
European Community in 1973, then its role in the banking crisis is now seen
as protecting the interests of Europe’s banks at the cost of placing a huge
burden on Irish taxpayers and making the prospects of economic recovery
more difficult.
The Irish reaction to EU-linked austerity measures however, was relatively
muted, considering the scale of the fiscal adjustments implemented after
2008. Opposition was channelled through the party system, and by 2011, a
change of government was inevitable. The Irish electorate duly punished
the ruling Fianna Fáil party for its part in the financial crisis. In the general elec-
tion of that year, Fianna Fáil won just 20 of 166 seats, while Fine Gael secured
76. This was short of a majority, leaving the party dependent on the Labour
Party to form the new coalition government. Enda Kenny, the then Fine
Gael leader, became Taoiseach, with Eamon Gilmore, the then Labour Party
leader, becoming Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade (Mulqueen, 2012,
p. 212). Whilst there is some evidence of a fragmenting and potentially historic
re-calibration of the Irish party system, it has not – to this point – produced
decisive systemic change. For sure, Ireland witnessed a surge in support for
Sinn Féin and some Eurosceptic independent TDs, but the party system never-
theless demonstrated as much continuity as change, in marked contrast to
other EU jurisdictions.
Despite the severity of the financial crisis and what was termed ‘an earth-
quake election’ in 2011 (see Gallagher and March, 2011), the impact on public
sentiment towards the EU was similarly minimal (see Simpson, 2019). In con-
trast to the two previous EU referendums (2001 and 2008), and fearful of the
consequences of rejecting another EU treaty, the Irish electorate supported
the Fiscal Treaty in a 2012 referendum. Public protest against austerity
(and/or the EU) was limited and largely centred around proposals to introduce
water charges. In effect, the Irish political system has accommodated public
displeasure with the EU and there remains a strong pro-EU consensus
within the Irish political system and across society more broadly, a sentiment
undoubtedly bolstered by the protracted Brexit drama. As Rees and O’Bren-
nan (2019) put it:
IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES 479
the Irish commitment to ‘Europe’ deepened significantly after the UK decision to
leave the EU was made in 2016: with every unanticipated crisis experienced by
the UK, the Irish choice to commit to European integration became more sharply
defined, despite the evident threat to Irish interests.
Interestingly too, the economic crisis did not change the preference of Irish
elites for the liberal market economy model. In fact, in many ways, the crisis
redoubled the commitment to neoliberalism. Ireland remains a highly globa-
lised liberal market economy, distinguished primarily by the extent of multi-
national control of the leading sectors of its economy (Coulter, 2015, p. 17).
The export sector, primarily US multinational companies (MNCs), continued
to expand during the crisis years and Ireland’s dependence on such MNCs
was greater in 2019 than in 2009.
After the financial crisis: a subtly different Ireland-EU
relationship
The EU’s polycrisis has given way to what might be the beginnings of a new
phase in Ireland-EU relations. By 2014, Ireland had become a net contributor
to the EU budget for the first time, and this happened just as the financial
crisis peaked. John Fitzgerald, however, (The Irish Times, 31 May 2019) demon-
strates what a good deal EU membership has been for Ireland since 1973.
While Irish receipts from the structural and cohesion funds peaked in the
1990s at about 3 per cent per year, averaged over the entire 45 years of mem-
bership, the payments averaged about 1 per cent a year of Gross National
Income (GNI). In addition:
Our cumulated payments to the EU since membership have amounted to
around 45 per cent of average annual income, compared with corresponding
receipts of 160 per cent. So the Republic has been a net beneficiary until the
current decade, and today makes only a small net contribution.
Fitzgerald also points out that in 2017 the Netherlands was the largest net
contributor to the EU at about €200 per person, followed by Sweden,
Germany, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Austria. Ireland’s contribution
amounted to only €50 per person, about one quarter the per capita contri-
bution ofDutchpeople and ‘a very small price topay for all thebenefits ofmem-
bership’. A study by Statistics Netherlands (2016) demonstrates that between
2000 and 2015, in fact, the Netherlands was the highest per capita contributor
to the EU budget. The impact of recent enlargements of the Union is important
here.Where Irelandwas abigbeneficiary in net terms until 2008, its positionhas
been taken by small states fromCentral and Eastern Europe: Lithuania, Hungary
and Estonia received between €300 and €450 per head in 2017.
Fitzgerald also examines the potential impact of losing the UK’s budgetary
contribution. This amounts to a minimum net amount of €7.5 billion per year
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(€110 per person). A proportionate increase across the EU27 would see the
Irish contribution rising by about €140 million per year, or €30 per head. Ger-
many’s contribution could more than double, from under €15 billion to €33
billion by the end of the next budgetary period in 2027. Similarly, the net con-
tribution by the Netherlands could rise by about 50 per cent to almost €15
billion (The Irish Times, 27 October 2019).
Ireland’s journey from being part of the poor, peripheral band of EU
member states in the 1980s and 1990s, to part of the new northern European,
wealthy ‘Hansa’ grouping is noteworthy. During the negotiations on the
Single European Act (SEA) in the mid-1980s, Ireland aligned itself with the
poorer Mediterranean states to argue that a deepening of market-based inte-
gration should be accompanied by redistributive measures which would help
them better compete with the wealthier member states of the EU. Despite
temporary ‘relegation’ as a result of the financial crisis to the group of so-
called PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), Ireland’s re-emergence
as a ‘Premier League’member state after the ‘troika era’ saw it embrace mem-
bership of the liberal, globalising, prosperous Hansa group as part of a broader
pivot in Irish foreign policy (see Rees and O’Brennan, 2019).
Ireland and the Brexit crisis
The re-positioning of Ireland within the European Union was influenced deci-
sively by the unfolding Brexit crisis after 2016. The UK vote to leave the EU on
23 June 2016 delivered a fundamental shock to the Irish body politic. The UK
was not just Ireland’s nearest neighbour, it was also one of its largest trading
partners (although declining in importance) especially for Irish agri-food
produce.3 The UK also provided a crucial physical link to EU markets (Ireland’s
‘land bridge’) and London was a key ally of Dublin within the European
Council and Council of Ministers in Brussels, specifically on issues that really
mattered to Ireland, including taxation and competition policy (O’Brennan,
2020). Brexit also posed substantial political and diplomatic challenges for
the British–Irish relationship which had only recently normalised and stabil-
ised in the context of the evolving Northern Ireland peace process. The UK
vote to Leave brought the Irish border back on the agenda in unsettling
and unpredictable ways and threatened to permanently alter the historic
1998 settlement (Laffan, 2020). Joint membership of the EU since 1973 had
provided a neutral landscape of more or less permanent negotiations, econ-
omic interdependence and legal interdiction; all of which helped significantly
improve UK-Irish relations. This positive trajectory was seriously disturbed by
the Brexit vote, which carried quite profound implications for constitutional
arrangements and inter-communal relations on the island of Ireland, as well
as relations between London and Dublin (Laffan, 2020; Murphy, 2018; O’Bren-
nan, 2019).
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Prior to the UK’s EU referendum in 2016, all of the mainstream political
parties in Ireland supported the UK remaining in the EU, including Sinn
Féin, believing this to be in Ireland’s interest (Holmes, 2016, p. 14; O’Brennan,
2020). Ireland’s initial position on the Brexit withdrawal was outlined by the
Taoiseach in a key speech delivered at the Institute of International and Euro-
pean Affairs (IIEA) in February 2017, entitled ‘Ireland at the heart of a changing
European Union’, and this was followed by the publication of key policy pos-
itions which reiterated Irish priorities in relation to protecting the Northern
Ireland peace process; trade and the economy; the Common Travel Area;
and the EU-Ireland relationship (see Murphy, 2019). The Irish government’s
position remained clear and resolute throughout the negotiation period, spor-
adically occasioning some opposition from elements within the UK political
establishment, but largely aligning with the EU’s approach. The extent to
which the EU has supported Ireland and demonstrated solidarity with the
Irish position on Brexit has been quite remarkable.
Content of this volume
Ireland’s ‘dual crisis’ after 2008 (the financial crisis and Brexit) can be con-
sidered a subset of the overall EU polycrisis, if indeed the Irish case demon-
strates specificities that are unique to Ireland. This ‘dual crisis’ provides the
context for the interrogation in this special issue of how Ireland’s relationship
with the EU has evolved over the past decade. Having provided an overview
of the financial crisis and its impact on Ireland and Irish-EU relations, individual
contributions evaluate how the financial crisis and Brexit have shaped the tra-
jectory of other EU policy areas.
Desmond Dinan (2019) provides an important contextual basis for under-
standing the range of challenges facing the EU as it navigated the polycrisis,
and critically examines the current ‘Future of Europe’ debate. This contextual
overview is instructive in honing our understanding of how the EU itself will
evolve in the future, its potential forms and functions, what the implications
are for specific policy areas, and what challenges these will pose for Ireland
and the pursuit of Irish interests in the EU.
Kathryn Simpson (2019) provides a comprehensive evaluation of Irish
public opinion on European integration. Her research demonstrates that the
‘dual crisis’ in Ireland’s EU membership did not fundamentally alter well-estab-
lished patterns of significant popular support for EU membership in Ireland.
Far from encouraging impulses towards so-called Ir-exit, the UK decision to
leave the EU encouraged a deep re-engagement with ‘Europe’ by Irish citizens
and this is reflected in the remarkable data produced in the annual Red C poll
conducted for European Movement Ireland in Spring 2019 which showed 93
per cent popular support for Irish membership of the European Union. Never-
theless, as Simpson demonstrates, Irish citizens’ support for European
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integration is highly contingent and cannot be taken for granted: the failed
referendums on Nice in 2001 and Lisbon in 2008 tell us that.
Aideen Elliott (2019) examines Ireland’s approach to migration and the
handling of the 2015 EU crisis around migration. She argues that Ireland’s
migration policy has incrementally converged toward EU norms. By virtue
of geography, Ireland was not directly impacted by the 2015 migration emer-
gency and so found it relatively easy to offer positive (‘soft’) support for the
EU’s attempt to collectivise the approach to migration. The Irish defence
forces actively participated in rescue efforts in the Mediterranean and
Ireland opted into the European Commission’s ‘burden-sharing plan’ to re-dis-
tribute refugees across the member states and to ease the burden on receiv-
ing states in southern Europe.
Diarmuid Torney and Roderic O’ Gorman (2019) provide compelling evi-
dence that Ireland has remained immune from Europeanisation pressures in
the climate change and broader environmental sphere. The escalating eco-
logical crisis, in fact, has done little to change Ireland’s long-term status as a
‘laggard’ in the EU environmental arena: the implementation of EU measures
in the field of climate and the environment remains partial, slow and unsatis-
factory. Ireland is a long way behind both its domestic commitments and EU
obligations and the Fine Gael led governments since 2011 have done little to
change this structural feature of Ireland’s relationship with the EU. Ireland’s
gravitation toward the Northern EU bloc of countries is challenged by its pos-
ition as an environmental outlier.
Mary C. Murphy (2019) examines the impact of Brexit on the island of
Ireland and the protracted Brexit crisis on British–Irish relations. She focuses
in some detail on the various political, economic and constitutional crises gen-
erated for Ireland by the Brexit vote and assesses how Brexit impacts on the
Europeanisation and/or de-Europeanisation of the Irish political system and
British–Irish relations. She alludes to the challenges which Brexit poses for
the traditional Europeanised characteristics of the Ireland-EU relationship
and the British–Irish relationship and determines that these will be challenged
within the confines of a post-Brexit EU.
Irish foreign policy was particularly challenged by the ‘dual crisis’ after
2008. Rees and O’Brennan (2019) explore how Irish institutions and diplomats
responded both to the financial crisis and Brexit. They argue that though Ire-
land’s foreign policy has remained remarkably consistent over time, the ‘dual
crisis’ placed considerable pressure on Irish state capacity and institutional
resources. Ireland’s financial implosion carried with it potentially catastrophic
consequences for the Eurozone and thus successive governments placed a
particular priority on restoring Ireland’s tarnished reputation within the Euro-
pean Union (O’Brennan, 2012a). At the same time, Irish foreign policy was
‘rebooted’ to take on a more muscular promotion of Irish economic interests
across the globe. The Brexit crisis set in train a determined effort by Irish
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policy-makers to both confirm the EU as Ireland’s ‘geopolitical centre of
gravity’ and to re-position the country within the Union, as the need for
new allies and coalition partners became evident following the United King-
dom’s planned departure. This commitment was reciprocated by the member
states and EU institutions with an unprecedented level of solidarity shown to
Ireland on Brexit.
Conclusion
The EU has weathered a series of profound challenges and crises since 2008,
and Ireland, more than other member states, was often at the centre of these
storms. The financial crisis in 2008 hit Ireland particularly hard and, simul-
taneously, threatened to collapse the entire Eurozone. The imposition of a
harsh regime of austerity via the ‘troika’ (2010–2013) undoubtedly damaged
the European Union’s image in Ireland, as the burden of ‘adjustment’ fell
almost entirely on the Irish people and rendered recovery much more
difficult and protracted. The crisis also demonstrated the extent to which
economic and market interdependence had advanced in the EU and the Euro-
zone after decades of closer cooperation among the member states and dee-
pening legal reciprocity between the constituent elements of the
supranational system of governance. The financial crisis, however, also
revealed the potential limits to the pooling of sovereignty by member
states. The re-assertion of intergovernmental impulses within the Eurozone
was just one manifestation of this phenomenon. Arguably, the lack of solidar-
ity shown to Ireland (and even more cogently, Greece) also demonstrates the
continuing importance of ‘preferences and power’ (Moravscik, 1993) within
the EU institutional architecture.
As Ireland was beginning to emerge from the worst effects of the financial
crisis, a second – potentially existential – blow was dealt. The UK decision to
leave the EU in June 2016 precipitated a political, economic and constitutional
crisis for the Irish state and consumed extraordinary amounts of Irish negotiat-
ing energy and political capital over an extended period of time. The EU’s soli-
darity with Ireland throughout the Brexit negotiations produced an entirely
different political dynamic than that which prevailed during the financial
crisis. To some extent, this was a response to the firm message coming
from Ireland after the Brexit vote which emphatically resolved that Ireland
would not follow the UK out of the EU and exchange the EU anchor for a
return to the historically asymmetrical relationship with the UK (Laffan,
2020). Arguably, Ireland would not have benefitted from EU solidarity to the
remarkable degree that it did after 2016 if it had not dealt effectively with
the post-2008 financial crisis. The goodwill engendered in Brussels and EU
capitals made it easier for Irish officials to ask for – and receive – EU
support when it was needed on Brexit. Similarly, the Irish commitment to
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‘Europe’ deepened significantly after the UK’s EU referendum result. Indeed,
with every unanticipated crisis experienced by the UK, the Irish choice to
commit to European integration became clearer, despite the potentially sig-
nificant collateral damage wrought on the island of Ireland by Brexit
(Laffan, 2020; O’Brennan, 2019).
Although the financial crisis and Brexit represented the most significant
challenges for the Irish state in terms of its relationship with the EU, there
are other aspects of the Ireland-EU nexus which may test the dynamics and
depth of the future relationship. The outplaying of the EU’s polycrisis has
impacted on Ireland’s relationship with the EU in ways which are subtle,
but potentially substantial. Political parties critical of the EU have fuelled a
degree of ‘soft’ Euroscepticism and the uncertainty about the UK’s long-
term relationship with the EU poses questions and problems for Ireland,
and more especially for Northern Ireland and British–Irish relations. Ireland
has also begun to reposition itself vis-à-vis other EU member states and has
demonstrated a willingness to countenance the deepening of EU integration
in some areas of activity and to pay more into the EU budget in the future.
Overall, however, evidence of both Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation
in the Irish context is limited, insofar as it applies to both domestic institutions
and the embedding of key EU policies in Irish legislation. Indeed,domestic
factors are effective and often decisive in mediating and nuancing the
impact of EU crises on Ireland’s polity, policies and politics. In that context,
Ireland provides evidence of an evolving political and economic landscape
demonstrating both continuity and change, where the relative influence of
the EU, in the shadow of crisis, is determined by discrete political circum-
stances and policy specific dynamics. However, navigating the continuing
economic and political demands of the EU membership landscape – for
example, tighter fiscal rules, future treaty revisions, moves towards tax harmo-
nisation, demanding environmental regulations, increased sharing of the
migration burden, and a developing EU foreign and defence capacity – as
the polycrisis subsides, points to continuing challenges for this small EU
state and its political representatives.
Notes
1. The period covered by this special issue is 2008–2019. This includes the
Lisbon Treaty referendums in 2008 and 2009; the Fiscal Treaty referendum
in 2012; the ‘Troika regime’ from 2010 to 2013, and the Brexit referendum
and subsequent negotiations between the EU and UK. Within the Brexit
talks we highlight the importance of the EU-UK ‘Joint Agreement’ of Decem-
ber 2017, the Withdrawal Agreement between the EU and Theresa May’s gov-
ernment (25 November 2018) and the revision of that agreement, and the
conclusion of a new agreement with the Boris Johnson government (27
October 2019).
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2. Of this, €22.5 billion came from the IMF; €22.5 billion from the EU Commission;
€17.5 billion from the European Financial Stability Fund; and a total of €5 billion
in bilateral loans from the UK, Sweden and Denmark.
3. In 2018, Ireland sent 50 per cent of its agri-food exports to the UK. In terms of
overall exports, however, the UK proportion had declined by 2018 to just over
10 percent. This represented a massive reduction from 1973 when Ireland
entered the EEC with the UK and sent fully 55 per cent of total exports to the
UK (reference).
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